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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are arrested and formally charged with a crime you
did not commit, or a crime for which you had a good defense at the
time of the offense and for some time thereafter. The police chose to
arrest and charge you the day before the five-year statute of limitations was set to run. You had no idea you were even being investigated up until the time of your arrest. Because of the lapse in time prior
to your arrest, your ability to defend yourself from the charges brought
against you has been severely hampered. Perhaps you had alibi witnesses or eyewitnesses that you could have called at trial to support
your case if the prosecution had formally charged you at an earlier
time—witnesses whose testimony would have all but confirmed your
innocence. Due to the five years that passed, however, those witnesses are either deceased, cannot be found, or cannot remember anything from that far back. You have no other witnesses that you can
call to support your defense and rebut the prosecution’s case.
Situations of pre-accusation delay like the one described above1 are
not protected by the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.2

J.D. 2013, cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to
thank my parents for their love and support. I would also like to thank Judge Ronald
Swanson, Florida First District Court of Appeal, for his helpful suggestions in choosing to
write about the topic of pre-accusation delay, and Professor Wayne Logan, Florida State
University College of Law, for his helpful guidance and feedback.
1. A similar and more detailed “illustration” can be found in Phyllis Goldfarb, When
Judges Abandon Analogy: The Problem of Delay in Commencing Criminal Prosecutions, 31
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That is because the “speedy trial provision . . . [is] ‘an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation
and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of
an accused to defend himself.’ ”3 However,
the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense. . . . Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with
the defendant’s liberty . . . and that may disrupt his employment,
drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to
public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.4

Conversely, the distinct constitutional anchors and purposes of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause make it a more appropriate safeguard in situations involving pre-accusation delay.5 Ordinarily, statutes of limitation act as the primary safeguard against preaccusation delay, but the Supreme Court has recognized that “the
Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against
WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 611-12 (1990), where the author describes facts similar to those
in a case that she litigated. Id. at 611 n.18.
2. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313-22 (1971). The Speedy Trial Clause
of the Sixth Amendment is not the focus of this Note but will be referred to at times. Thus,
it bears mentioning the general approach that the Supreme Court set forth for analyzing
speedy trial claims: “The approach . . . is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
Factors to consider—“[t]hough some [courts] might express them in different ways”—are:
“[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.” Id. None of these factors are “necessary or sufficient
condition[s] to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. at 533. Unlike
pre-accusation delay, “the Speedy Trial Clause’s core concern is impairment of liberty.”
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986). Cases and law review articles have
examined speedy trial rights both before and after Barker, but one recent law review
article has also examined speedy trial rights in the international context, focusing on India.
See Jayanth K. Krishnan & C. Raj Kumar, Delay in Process, Denial of Justice: The
Jurisprudence and Empirics of Speedy Trials in Comparative Perspective, 42 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 747 (2011).
3. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 324-26. Courts refer to this delay as pre-accusation delay, preindictment delay, pre-arrest delay, and other similar terms. Throughout this Note, I will
use the phrase “pre-accusation delay” because the topic involves delay prior to formal
accusation. Formal accusation is “triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official
accusation.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992). When one formally
becomes an “accused,” speedy trial protections under the Sixth Amendment come into play.
See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”). The pre-accusation delay covered in this Note
does not encompass the pre-arrest delay situation confronted in Doggett, where the
defendant had previously been indicted but not arrested. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 648-50.
Thus, although he had not been arrested, he was nonetheless formally accused at the time
of his arrest and his claim was examined under the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 652.
Rather, this Note deals with pre-accusation delay cases where the defendant has not been
formally accused in any sense. See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977);
Marion, 404 U.S. 307.
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oppressive delay.”6 Even if the statute of limitations in a given case
has not run, pre-accusation delay may cause a defendant to “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” in violation of the Fifth Amendment.7
While pre-accusation delay carries this potential due process violation, courts dispute the proper test to apply in determining whether
a violation did in fact occur.8 All courts require actual prejudice; some
require the prejudice to be substantial as well.9 Also, most courts require bad faith or intentional, tactical delay by the government in
addition to prejudice; some courts, however, do not require a showing
of bad faith but instead—after a finding of prejudice—balance the
government’s reasons for the delay against the prejudice.10
Part II of this Note examines the leading United States Supreme
Court cases on pre-accusation delay, as well as the framework the
Court set out for lower courts confronting the issue. Part III discusses the test applied by the different circuit courts of appeals. Specifically, it explores the evolution of the approach established by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, discusses which
circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit and which circuits do not, and
then looks at the conflicting cases decided by the Seventh Circuit.
Part IV examines how the states approach the issue of pre-accusation
delay. It categorizes each of the states in a manner similar to the federal circuits and also separately reviews cases from a few states with
unclear positions. This is the first piece to complete a fifty-state survey on the issue of pre-accusation delay. Part V analyzes some disputes over the proper test to use and argues that it is time for the
Supreme Court to again review the issue, as it has not done so in
thirty-five years, and much confusing jurisprudence has emerged
from various courts in that time.

6. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); Marion, 404
U.S. at 324 (“[S]ince a criminal trial is the likely consequence of our judgment and since
appellees may claim actual prejudice to their defense, it is appropriate to note here that the
statute of limitations does not fully define the appellees’ rights with respect to the events
occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the Government concedes that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial
that the pre-[accusation] delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees’ rights
to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over
the accused.” (citations omitted)).
8. See infra Parts III-IV.
9. See infra Parts III-IV. One possible exception is New York, as it is unclear
whether New York courts require prejudice at all. See infra pp. 682-83.
10. See infra Parts III-IV.
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II. BACKGROUND: SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
PRE-ACCUSATION DELAY
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court officially recognized for
the first time that pre-accusation delay caused by the prosecution in
a criminal case may result in a violation of a defendant’s due process
rights.11 In establishing this major development in criminal law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention
that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights are applicable in a situation involving pre-accusation delay.12 Instead, the Court
distinguished speedy trial rights, finding they only apply after one
becomes an “accused.”13 What makes the potential due process violation so exceptional is that it adds a constitutional protection to supplement the protection already afforded by statutes of limitation in
the context of pre-accusation delay.14 Statutes of limitation provide
“the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.”15 The Supreme Court has noted that
[t]he purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to
criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the
occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by
criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when
the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time
and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts
in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. 16

These observations have led the Court to conclude it is not necessary “to press the Sixth Amendment into service” to address
pre-accusation delay.17
Even though the Sixth Amendment is not at play, examining
whether potential due process violations exist under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment is necessary because statutes of limitation do
not “fully define” an individual’s rights prior to indictment or arrest.18
Furthermore, statutes of limitation do not curtail the prosecution of
capital offenses and certain other crimes; prosecution of those offenses
11. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324-26.
12. Id. at 313-22.
13. Id. at 313; see also supra notes 2, 5.
14. Marion, 404 U.S. at 322-24. However, as will be discussed further, not all states
have statutes of limitations, and even states that do have them do not necessarily have
them for all crimes. See infra Part V.
15. Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966)).
16. Id. at 323 (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 324. “[T]he Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting
against oppressive delay.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977).
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can be initiated at any time absent a due process violation.19 It is
well-established that dismissal of a case is required by the Due Process Clause when pre-accusation delay results in substantial prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial, if that “delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the [defendant].”20 With
respect to the prejudice inquiry, however, the exact amount of prejudice that must be demonstrated for a due process violation to be recognized is unclear. In addition, it is not evident whether prevailing on a
claim requires that the delay constitute “an intentional device to gain
a tactical advantage,” or whether recklessness, gross negligence, or
even simple negligence by the government may suffice.21 The Supreme
Court did not directly answer this question in Marion.22 Rather, it asserted that due process claims based on pre-accusation delay should
be considered and disposed of on a case-by-case basis, acknowledging
that very short delays can cause prejudice to a defendant’s case, but
that dismissal is not warranted by “every delay-caused detriment.”23
Approximately five-and-a-half years after Marion, the Supreme
Court further considered pre-accusation delay in United States v.
Lovasco.24 While the Court did introduce a few additional principles,
it did not fully clarify the level of prejudice required and again refrained from explicitly stating whether intentional delay for tactical
purposes is required or whether something less could lead to a successful claim.25 The Court did, however, address its statement in
Marion that “[e]vents of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice,
but at the present time [defendants]’ due process claims are speculative and premature.”26 From this sentence flows the notion that
although proof of actual prejudice does not make a claim “automatically valid,” it does make it “concrete and ripe for adjudication.”27
Therefore, demonstrating actual prejudice is necessary—but not
sufficient—to prove a due process violation based on pre-accusation
delay.28 Examining a claim brought in response to the delay also
requires “consider[ing] the reasons for the delay as well as the
prejudice to the accused.”29
19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2012).
20. See, e.g., Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. In Marion, “the Government concede[d] that the
Due Process Clause . . . require[s] dismissal . . . if it were shown at trial that the preindictment delay . . . caused substantial prejudice to [one’s] rights to a fair trial and that
the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.” Id.
21. See id. at 324-26.
22. See generally id.
23. Id. at 324-25.
24. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
25. See generally id.
26. Id. at 789 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 326).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 790.
29. Id.
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In Lovasco, the Court recognized that the judiciary’s only task in
resolving due process claims concerning pre-accusation delay is to
determine whether the delay “violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,’30 and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ”31 While delays may sometimes rise to that level, judges
should afford deference to a prosecutor’s decision as to when to seek
an indictment rather than imposing their own personal views.32 A
prosecutor has no duty to file charges if she does not think she can
prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt, even if there is probable
cause to proceed; she is also not necessarily duty-bound to file charges at the very moment she first believes she can prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.33 The imposition of a contrary requirement would
carry many negative consequences.34 As part of its discussion in
Lovasco, the Court distinguished “investigative delay” from “delay
undertaken by the Government solely ‘to gain tactical advantage over
the accused,’ ”35 finding that “investigative delay is not so onesided.”36 The Court held that prosecuting a defendant subsequent to
investigative delay does not violate the Due Process Clause, even if

30. Id. (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
31. Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)).
32. See id.
33. Id. at 791.
34. See id. at 791-93 (“To impose such a duty ‘would have a deleterious effect both
upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.’ From the
perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to commence when probable
cause is established is undesirable because it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted
charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but
untried. . . . From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate
prosecution upon probable cause is equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources
of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited. And from the standpoint of the
courts, such a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be
consumed on cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the
responsible parties or some of the criminal acts. . . . [In addition, a rule] compelling a
prosecutor to file public charges as soon as the requisite proof has been developed against
one participant on one charge would cause numerous problems in those cases in which a
criminal transaction involves more than one person or more than one illegal act. . . .
[I]nsisting on immediate prosecution once sufficient evidence is developed to obtain a
conviction would [also] pressure prosecutors into resolving doubtful cases in favor of
early—and possibly unwarranted—prosecutions.” (footnotes and citations omitted)).
35. Id. at 795 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971)).
36. Id. The Government again conceded intentional, tactical delay that causes
substantial prejudice constitutes a due process violation. The Government, however,
further conceded that “[a] due process violation might also be made out upon a showing of
prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to the
prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk that delay would impair the
ability to mount an effective defense.” Id. at 795 n.17 (quoting Brief for United States at
32-33 n.25, Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (No. 75-1844)).
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the delay caused some prejudice.37 In closing, the Court reiterated that
lower courts should consider these claims on a case-by-case basis.38
III. HOW THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS HAVE INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED MARION AND LOVASCO
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Strict Two-Prong Approach
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lovasco on June 9,
1977,39 and preceding the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Townley on January 11, 1982,40 the Fifth Circuit issued roughly thirteen written opinions discussing Marion, Lovasco, and the issue of
pre-accusation delay.41 Then, in Townley, the court attempted to clarify its position and resolve questions that arose over the years from
the way it disposed of pre-accusation delay cases.42 Despite ruling in
favor of the government in Townley,43 the court adopted a test (hereinafter “Townley test”) that was less stringent than what the government proposed.44 The court recognized that Marion and Lovasco
require actual prejudice, as well as consideration of the reasons for
the delay.45 Thus, under the Townley test, a defendant must first
prove the government’s delay caused actual prejudice to her case.46 If
the defendant is unable to demonstrate actual prejudice, then the
claim automatically fails.47 If the defendant, however, successfully
proves actual prejudice, then the Townley test requires that the trial
37. Id. at 796.
38. Id. at 797. The Supreme Court noted, as in Marion, it still “could not determine in
the abstract the circumstances in which pre[-]accusation delay would require dismissing
prosecutions.” Id. at 796 (citing Marion, 404 U.S. at 324). Significantly, “in the intervening
years [between Marion and Lovasco] so few defendants . . . established that they were
prejudiced by delay that neither [the Supreme Court] nor any lower court . . . had a
sustained opportunity to consider the constitutional significance of various reasons for
delay.” Id. at 796-97.
39. See id. at 783.
40. 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1982), rejected by United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
41. See United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Nixon, 634 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Surface, 624 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Marino, 617
F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Ramos, 586 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Parker, 586 F.2d 422 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Willis, 583 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. MedinaArellano, 569 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. West, 568 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Shaw, 555 F.2d
1295 (5th Cir. 1977).
42. See generally 665 F.2d 579.
43. Id. at 580.
44. See id. at 582.
45. Id. at 581 (citing West, 568 F.2d at 367); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
46. See Townley, 665 F.2d at 581-82.
47. Id.
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court “engage ‘in a sensitive balancing of the government’s need for
an investigative delay . . . against the prejudice asserted by the defendant.’ ”48 The Townley panel said Marion and Lovasco “do not
stand for the proposition ‘that governmental interests not amounting
to an intentional tactical delay will automatically justify prejudice to
a defendant.’ ”49 According to the court, while this assertion conflicted
with scattered dicta from previous Fifth Circuit cases, it was consistent with the court’s holdings in earlier decisions.50
Townley remained good law until 1996, whereupon the Fifth Circuit granted an en banc rehearing in United States v. Crouch and rejected the Townley test.51 The indictment in Crouch was initially
dismissed by the trial court, and it was subsequently affirmed on appeal by a divided panel of Fifth Circuit judges.52 After the en banc
rehearing, the court abandoned its position from Townley and instead
held that bringing a successful claim of pre-accusation delay requires
proof of actual, substantial prejudice and “that the prosecution purposely delayed the indictment to gain tactical advantage or for other
bad faith purpose.”53 Although the court announced this new test, it
still held that the defendant failed to even meet his burden of demonstrating actual and substantial prejudice, as opposed to simply potential prejudice.54 According to the court, “[e]vents of the trial may
demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time appellees’ due
process claims are speculative and premature.”55
In rejecting Townley, the Fifth Circuit noted it was “not strictly
bound by prior panel decisions.”56 Nonetheless, it asserted that its
holding remained in accord with the majority of its prior decisions,
48. Id. at 582 (quoting United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977)).
49. Id. (quoting Brand, 556 F.2d at 1317 n.7).
50. Id.; see also id. at 582 n.2 (“The statement is for the most part found in decisions
that found that the defendant did not meet the threshold requirement of proving actual
prejudice, so that the government’s justification for the delay was not brought into issue:
United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ramos, 586 F.2d
1078, 1079 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Willis, 583 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1107 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Butts, 524
F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 1975). The general statement of the governmental malice
requirement is also found in at least two other decisions, but there the reason for the
government’s delay was factually reviewed and found justified (as in Lovasco) by
investigative needs: United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 309–10 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1981).”).
51. See United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Interestingly,
as will be discussed below, even though Townley is no longer good law in the Fifth Circuit,
the Fourth Circuit’s test mirrors the Townley test. See infra Part III.C. In addition, the
Townley test was adopted by Florida courts and remains good law in Florida. See infra
pp. 678-79.
52. 84 F.3d at 1499.
53. Id. at 1500.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971)).
56. Id. at 1509. Precedent from prior panels can only be overturned by the court
sitting en banc. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 857 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982).
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even if language to the contrary existed in scattered opinions.57 The
court then further discussed its rationale for requiring intentional,
tactical delay or some other bad-faith purpose.58 It reasoned that neither Marion nor Lovasco referred to “balancing” or “weighing” prejudice against the reasons given for the delay.59 The court also observed
that the Supreme Court’s language in United States v. Gouveia,60 “albeit in dicta,” appeared to support its interpretation of Marion and
Lovasco.61 It noted that most circuit courts of appeals stood in agreement with its holding.62 Moreover, the court offered two further explanations to support its reasoning.63 First, it asserted, “[h]istorically,
this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions
of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,”64 meaning “the Due Process Clause . . . is not implicated by
the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life,
liberty or property.”65 Second, the court stated that finding a due process violation when the government acted in good faith could lead to
separation-of-powers issues.66
After concluding its discussion of bad faith, the court reviewed the
prejudice requirement.67 It reiterated that the prejudice prong is not
met by merely demonstrating presumptive or potential prejudice, but
that “actual” prejudice must be shown.68 In addition, the court asserted that the prejudice has to be “substantial” as well.69 According
to the court, requiring actual, substantial prejudice is consistent
with the notion of due process,70 and “deprivation [of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law] will normally occur only by
57. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1508-09. On that note, the court mentioned a handful of postMarion, pre-Lovasco cases, as well as numerous other post-Lovasco cases decided by the
Fifth Circuit with similar holdings. See id. at 1508, 1509 n.9.
58. See id. at 1510-14.
59. Id. at 1510.
60. 467 U.S. 180 (1984).
61. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1510; Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192 (“But applicable statutes of
limitations protect against the prosecution’s bringing stale criminal charges against any
defendant, and, beyond that protection, the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an
indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can
prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to
gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his
defense.” (citations omitted)). The Supreme Court in Gouveia, however, merely repeated
what it said in Marion. That is, dismissal is required under the stated circumstances. This
does not mean, however, that dismissal is required only under these circumstances.
62. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1511-12. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of cases from
those circuits.
63. See Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1512-14.
64. Id. at 1513 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
65. Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986)).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1514-23.
68. Id. at 1515.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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conviction, and not simply by trial itself.”71 Relying on United States
v. MacDonald72 and United States v. Marion,73 the Fifth Circuit then
stated that one who is unsuccessful in proving pre-accusation delay
prior to trial can always raise the claim again following trial, with a
greater chance of prevailing at that point.74 From this, the court concluded that “a far stronger showing is required to establish the requisite actual, substantial prejudice pretrial than would be required after trial and conviction.”75 The court even went a step further and
remarked, “it is difficult to imagine how a pretrial showing of prejudice would not in almost all cases be to some significant extent speculative and potential rather than actual and substantial.”76
B. Other Circuits Using a Strict Two-Prong Approach
When the Fifth Circuit decided Crouch, it noted that the First,
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits
agreed with the rule it applied;77 that is, when the statute of limitations


71. Id. at 1516; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. Interestingly, by parenthetical, the
Fifth Circuit compares the following statements made by the Supreme Court in Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983): “Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional
purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim
of entitlement.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516 (quoting Olim, 461 U.S. at 250).
72. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). In relying on MacDonald, the Fifth Circuit analogized to the
Supreme Court’s statement that “[u]nlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Speedy Trial Clause does not . . . encompass a ‘right not to be tried’ which must
be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516 (quoting
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 861). To further support its contention, the Fifth Circuit also
mentioned the following language from MacDonald:
Before trial, of course, an estimate of the degree to which delay has impaired
an adequate defense tends to be speculative. . . . The essence of a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has
frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged. Normally, it
is only after trial that that claim may fairly be assessed.
Id. (quoting MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 858-59). Interestingly, even though the Fifth Circuit
analogized to the Speedy Trial Clause here, it had just concluded saying the trial court’s
reliance on Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), was misplaced, because Doggett
involved a case of post-indictment delay brought under the Sixth Amendment. Crouch,
84 F.3d at 1515.
73. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). The Fifth Circuit mentioned the Supreme Court’s statement
that “[e]vents of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time
appellees’ due process claims are speculative and premature.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516
(quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 326). In a parenthetical, the Fifth Circuit also mentioned
the Supreme Court’s statement in MacDonald that “[t]he denial of a pretrial motion to
dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds does not indicate that a like motion made
after trial—when prejudice can better be gauged—would also be denied.” Id. (quoting
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 858-59).
74. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1511-12. The opinion cited the following cases from those circuits: United
States v. Crooks, 766 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Brown, 959
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has not run, “dismissal for [pre-accusation] delay requires a showing
not only of substantial, actual prejudice, but also that the prosecutor
intentionally delayed [formal accusation] to gain tactical advantage
or to advance some other improper purpose.”78 An updated examination of cases from those circuits indicates that they all—with the exception of the Seventh Circuit, which has not been clear on its position79—still appear to require intentional, tactical delay or some other bad-faith purpose instead of a more flexible balancing test.80 Interestingly though, in considering the separate but related issue of
whether a delay prior to resentencing violates the Due Process
Clause, the Second Circuit has employed a balancing test (instead of
a strict bad-faith requirement), despite vehemently analogizing
to the context of due process violations based on pre-accusation delay.81 This, at least in part, seems to weigh against the Fifth Circuit’s
deliberateness rationale.82


F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Engstrom, 965 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hayes, 40 F.3d 362 (11th Cir.
1994); and United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991). These opinions do not use
identical language, but they all essentially require intentional, tactical delay or some other
type of bad faith.
78. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1511.
79. In fact, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Seventh Circuit case it cited in
Crouch was not entirely accurate. See infra Part III.D.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Bater, 594 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[E]xcessive pre[accusation] delay can sometimes, albeit rarely, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause if the defendant shows both that the ‘delay caused substantial prejudice to his right
to a fair trial’ and that ‘the [g]overnment intentionally delayed indictment . . . to gain a
tactical advantage.’ ” (quoting United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1986)));
United States v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A defendant bears the ‘heavy
burden’ of proving both that he suffered actual prejudice because of the alleged pre[accusation] delay and that such delay was a course intentionally pursued by the
government for an improper purpose.”); United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 150-51 (3d
Cir. 2000) (“[The defendant] can make out a claim under the Due Process Clause only if he
can show both (1) that the delay between the crime and the federal indictment actually
prejudiced his defense; and (2) that the government deliberately delayed bringing the
indictment in order to obtain an improper tactical advantage or to harass him.”); United
States v. Schaffer, 586 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In this circuit, dismissal for pre[accusation] delay ‘is warranted only when the defendant shows substantial prejudice to
his right to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device by the government to
gain a tactical advantage.’ ” (quoting United States v. Greene, 737 F.2d 572, 574 (6th Cir.
1984))); United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 465 (10th Cir. 2006) (“To prevail on
such a claim, the defendant must prove (1) the delay resulted in substantial prejudice to
his rights, and (2) the prosecution intentionally delayed prosecution in order to gain a
tactical advantage.”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[F]or
. . . dismissal to [be] proper, [one must show] that pre-indictment delay caused him actual
[and] substantial prejudice and that the delay was the product of a deliberate act by the
government designed to gain a tactical advantage.”); Mills, 925 F.2d at 464 (“Such delay
offends due process if the defendant can carry the burden of showing ‘(1) that the government
delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain a tactical advantage; and (2) that the delay
caused him actual and substantial prejudice.’ ” (quoting United States v. Fuesting, 845 F.2d
664, 669 (7th Cir. 1988))).
81. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199-202 (2d Cir. 2009).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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Significantly, the Eighth Circuit was omitted from the Fifth Circuit’s
list in Crouch. The reason for this is because of conflicting decisions
issued by the Eighth Circuit in the years leading up to Crouch, which
the Fifth Circuit at least recognized in a footnote.83 Specifically, the
Eighth Circuit’s 1994 decision in United States v. Miller,84 which used
a balancing test, conflicted with its decision in United States v.
Stierwalt85 from earlier that year, as well as its decision in United
States v. Scoggins86 from the previous year. As the Fifth Circuit noted, Miller did not reference either case.87 Although the Eighth Circuit
has issued conflicting decisions on pre-accusation delay, its more recent cases appear to be in accord with the Fifth Circuit.88
C. Circuits that Reject the Strict Two-Prong Test
Contrary to the Courts of Appeals that require proof of bad faith
to prevail on a claim of pre-accusation delay where “actual prejudice”
is found to exist, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits balance the prejudice
against the reasons offered by the government to justify the delay.89
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit only cited the now-overruled Townley decision when it adopted this approach in Automated Medical Laboratories.90 In discussing its reasons for utilizing a balancing test in
another case, the Fourth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court’s
mandate of a case-by-case inquiry makes a balancing test more appropriate than a black-letter rule.91 The Ninth Circuit has applied


83. See 84 F.3d at 1512 n.15.
84. 20 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
85. 16 F.3d 282 (8th Cir. 1994).
86. 992 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1993).
87. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1512 n.15.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 446 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2006) (“In contrast
to the balancing test used in Sixth Amendment cases, defendants claiming a due process
violation for pre-indictment delay must carry the burden of proof on two separate elements.
The defendant must establish that: (1) the delay resulted in actual and substantial
prejudice to the presentation of his defense; and (2) the government intentionally delayed
his indictment either to gain a tactical advantage or to harass him.” (citing United States
v. Sturdy, 207 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2000))).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Uribe-Rios, 558 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2009) (“First, we
ask whether the defendant has satisfied his burden of proving ‘actual prejudice.’ Second, if
that threshold requirement is met, we consider the government’s reasons for the delay,
‘balancing the prejudice to the defendant with the Government’s justification for delay.’ ”
(citing United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir. 1985)));
United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[The defendant]
must satisfy both prongs of a two-part test. First, he must prove ‘actual, non-speculative
prejudice from the delay.’ Second, the length of the delay is weighed against the reasons for
the delay . . . .” (citations omitted)). As these two cases show, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
only require “actual prejudice,” rather than “actual and substantial prejudice.” The Third
Circuit also appears to not require “substantial” prejudice, even though it agrees with the
Fifth Circuit on bad faith. See United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 150-51 (3d Cir.
2000); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir. 1987).
90. See 770 F.2d at 403-04.
91. Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir. 1990).
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similar reasoning and has also explained that Marion and Lovasco do
“not set out intent or recklessness as required standards of fault.”92
D. No Clear Position in the Seventh Circuit
In the years leading up to Crouch, the Seventh Circuit issued conflicting decisions on pre-accusation delay.93 Its position is still not entirely clear. Interestingly, when the Fifth Circuit discussed the other
circuits in agreement with its approach in Crouch, it mentioned the
Seventh Circuit and cited United States v. Sowa94 in support.95 In
Sowa, the Seventh Circuit never did clearly adopt the same approach
as the Fifth Circuit in Crouch. In fact, the court in Crouch may have
been partially incorrect with the manner in which it categorized
Sowa. The Sowa opinion states intentional, tactical delay is required,96 but it also asserts that “once the defendant has proven actual and substantial prejudice, the government must come forward
and provide its reasons for the delay. The government’s reasons are
then balanced against the defendant’s prejudice to determine whether the defendant has been denied due process.”97 This was echoed in
United States v. Pardue, a case the Seventh Circuit decided after the
Fifth Circuit decided Crouch.98 Yet, a more recent case from the Seventh Circuit considered intentional, tactical delay to be a requirement but said nothing about the balancing test used in the circuit’s
previous cases and failed to mention Sowa or Pardue.99 As the foregoing demonstrates, the Seventh Circuit still appears conflicted over
the proper test.
IV. THE STATES
Many opinions on pre-accusation delay have been issued by the
different U.S. Courts of Appeals since Marion and Lovasco, but an
examination of how the states handle the issue is also important. Not
all of the states can be categorized as cleanly as the circuits, but this
Part nevertheless attempts to categorize the fifty states and dives
into a further discussion of the approach followed by a handful of

92. United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1985).
93. See United States v. Hollins, 811 F.2d 384, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Within this
circuit there is conflicting authority as to whether, after a showing of actual and
substantial prejudice has been made by the defendant, the defendant then bears the
additional burden of proving that the government delayed the indictment for a tactical
advantage or some other impermissible purpose, or if the burden is then shifted to the
government to show why the pre-indictment delay was necessary.” (citations omitted)); see
also Hoo v. United States, 484 U.S. 1035, 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (denial of cert.).
94. 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1994).
95. See United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1512 (5th Cir. 1996).
96. See Sowa, 34 F.3d at 450.
97. Id. at 451.
98. See United States v. Pardue, 134 F.3d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1998).
99. See United States v. Wallace, 326 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2003).
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those states.100 Significantly, while the individual protections provided by the U.S. Constitution establish a floor to which the states must
adhere, it does not put a ceiling in place. Thus, states are free to provide greater protections under their own state constitutions.101
A. States Using a Strict Two-Prong Approach
States that use a strict two-prong test requiring bad faith, an improper purpose, harassment, deliberate action, or recklessness102 as a
prong103 include: Alabama,104 Arizona,105 Arkansas,106 Connecticut,107
Georgia,108 Idaho,109 Indiana,110 Iowa,111 Kansas,112 Kentucky,113 Maryland,114 Massachusetts,115 Minnesota,116 Mississippi,117 Missouri,118 Nebraska,119 Nevada,120 New Jersey,121 New Mexico,122 North Carolina,123

100. In conducting searches on Westlaw to determine how each state approaches preaccusation delay cases, the author used the following search terms: (Marion or Lovasco) &
(pre! /3 delay) & “due process”.
101. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 88 (2012).
102. A few states discussed in this section allow recklessness to meet part two of the
test. Nonetheless, they have been placed in this category because they still adhere to a
strict two-part test as opposed to a more lenient balancing test.
103. Actual prejudice is the other prong. Most of these states also require the actual
prejudice to be substantial.
104. See infra pp. 673-74.
105. See, e.g., State v. Broughton, 752 P.2d 483, 486 (Ariz. 1988).
106. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 188 S.W.3d 921, 927-28 (Ark. 2004).
107. See, e.g., State v. Morrill, 498 A.2d 76, 86 (Conn. 1985) (“In order to establish a
due process violation because of pre-accusation delay, the defendant must show both that
actual substantial prejudice resulted from the delay and that the reasons for the
delay were wholly unjustifiable, as where the state seeks to gain a tactical advantage over
the defendant.”).
108. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 614 S.E.2d 781, 783 (Ga. 2005).
109. See infra p. 674.
110. See infra p. 674.
111. See infra pp. 674-75.
112. See, e.g., State v. Crume, 22 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Kan. 2001).
113. See, e.g., Kirk v. Commonwealth, 6 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Ky. 1999). The Kentucky
Supreme Court has interpreted Marion to require intentional, tactical delay. See Reed v.
Commonwealth, 738 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky. 1987).
114. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 774 A.2d 1136, 1156 (Md. 2001).
115. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 387 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Mass. 1979).
Recklessness will satisfy the second prong in Massachusetts. See, e.g., id.
116. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 275 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. 1978). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has not evaluated pre-accusation delay cases in much depth. Nonetheless,
it falls in this category because it interprets Lovasco to require intentional, tactical delay.
See id.
117. See, e.g., Killen v. State, 05-KA-01393-SCT (¶ 69) (Miss. 2007). According to the
Mississippi Supreme Court, it adopted the requirement of intentional delay from the
United States Supreme Court. See id.
118. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 621 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo. 1981).
119. See State v. Glazebrook, 803 N.W.2d 767, 777 (Neb. 2011).
120. See infra p. 675.
121. See State v. Townsend, 897 A.2d 316, 325 (N.J. 2006). New Jersey interprets the
federal standard as requiring deliberate government action, and it appears to apply the
same standard under state law as well. See id.
122. See, e.g., Gonzales v. State, 805 P.2d 630, 632 (N.M. 1991).
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Oklahoma,124 Pennsylvania,125 Rhode Island,126 Texas,127 Utah,128
Vermont,129 Virginia,130 Wisconsin,131 and Wyoming.132
ALABAMA. The Alabama Supreme Court does not appear to have
encountered any cases that are on-point. The Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, has reviewed a number of pre-accusation
delay cases133 and has adopted the following position:
The law is well-settled that in order to establish a due process
violation due to pre[-accusation] delay, a defendant must show
(1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the conduct of his defense, and (2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action
by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage. A defendant is charged with a heavier burden of proof in showing a
pre[-accusation] delay due process violation than in showing a denial of his speedy trial rights.134


123. See, e.g., State v. Swann, 370 S.E.2d 533, 537 (N.C. 1988).
124. While Oklahoma’s position is not entirely evident, it does appear to require
intentional, tactical delay. See Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1991) (“The delay
in the present case was not a ‘tactical’ delay designed to impair the ability of the
[defendant] to mount an effective defense.”).
125. See infra pp. 675-76.
126. See State v. Vanasse, 593 A.2d 58, 64 (R.I. 1991).
127. See, e.g., State v. Krizan-Wilson, 354 S.W.3d 808, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(“[T]his Court . . . has held for more than two decades that, in order to establish a dueprocess violation, [a defendant] has the burden of proving both prejudice and that an
intentional delay was designed to give the state a tactical advantage.”). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has final appellate jurisdiction in state criminal cases in Texas. See
Court Structure of Texas, TEX. CTS. ONLINE, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/ (last updated
Mar. 8, 2013).
128. See State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶¶ 42-49, 152 P.3d 321. In Hales, the Utah
Supreme Court noted that its previous cases on pre-accusation delay were inconsistent
with regard to the proper test. Id. ¶ 45. As a result, it took the opportunity to clarify its
position, stating that “[a]s a matter of federal law . . . the defendant [must] show (1) actual
prejudice and (2) delay for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage or for another bad
faith motive.” Id. ¶ 49.
129. See State v. Beer, 2004 VT 99, ¶ 39, 177 Vt. 245, 864 A.2d 643, overruled on other
grounds by State v. Brillon, 2008 VT 35, 183 Vt. 475, 955 A.2d 1108; see also State v. Ellis,
542 A.2d 279, 282 (Vt. 1988) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that, to prove a
violation of due process, the defendant must show both that he suffered actual prejudice to
the conduct of his defense and that the delay was intentional and caused by a desire to
gain tactical advantage.” (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971))).
130. See Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 569 S.E.2d 47, 52 (Va. 2002).
131. See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶ 45, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227.
132. See, e.g., Remmick v. State, 2012 WY 57, ¶ 16, 275 P.3d 467, 470 (Wyo. 2012).
Significantly, “Wyoming has no statute of limitations for criminal offenses, and prosecution
for such offenses may be commenced at any time during the life of the offender.” Id.
(quoting Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wyo. 1992)); see also Lindsey Powell,
Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 147 (2008); Justin
Daraie, Comment, Criminal Law—The Road Not Taken: Parameters of the Speedy Trial
Right and How Due Process Can Limit Prosecutorial Delay; Humphrey v. State, 185 P.3d
1236 (Wyo. 2008), 9 WYO. L. REV. 171, 189 (2009).
133. See, e.g., Craft v. State, 90 So. 3d 197 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
134. See, e.g., State v. Prince, 581 So. 2d 874, 878 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court of criminal appeals has suggested recklessness may satisfy
the second prong in Alabama.135 With regard to the prejudice prong,
the prejudice must be actual and substantial.136
IDAHO. In Idaho, the clear position is that “[b]efore a due process
violation can be found, a defendant must show that the pre[-]accusation
delay ‘. . . caused substantial prejudice to [defendants’] rights to a fair
trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.’ ”137 Significantly, in State v. Wilbanks, the
Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Marion requires this position.138
Moreover, Wilbanks was decided prior to Lovasco.139 Nonetheless, the
Idaho Supreme Court maintained its pre-Lovasco position in later
cases without considering the additional framework elicited by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lovasco.140
INDIANA. The Indiana Supreme Court has not unequivocally
asserted what it considers to be the proper test to utilize in adjudicating claims of pre-accusation delay. Nonetheless, it has used language
indicating that it agrees with the strict bad-faith approach. In one of
its on-point cases, the court found no due process violation, reasoning
in part that the “defendant has not shown that the delay in his prosecution was a deliberate attempt by the State to gain unfair advantage.”141 In addition, at least one case decided in the Indiana Court
of Appeals has stated that intentional, tactical delay is required.142
IOWA. At first glance, Iowa appears to use a balancing test, but a
further examination of relevant Iowa Supreme Court cases leads to a
contrary conclusion. In State v. Trompeter, the court said that “[t]o
prove a pre-accusatorial delay violated due process, the defendant
must show: (1) the delay was unreasonable; and (2) the defendant’s
defense was thereby prejudiced.”143 It further asserted that a balancing test must be undertaken.144 Interestingly, State v. Lange was one of
the cases Trompeter cited to support its statement about the balancing


135. See Cherry v. State, 933 So. 2d 377, 380 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (“Lovasco
apparently includes evidence of ‘reckless disregard of circumstances known to the
prosecution . . .’ ” (quoting Stoner v. State, 418 So. 2d 171, 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982))).
136. Prince, 581 So. 2d at 878.
137. State v. Murphy, 584 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 1978) (quoting United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971)); see also State v. Kruse, 606 P.2d 981, 983 (Idaho 1980).
138. See 509 P.2d 331, 336 (Idaho 1973).
139. Wilbanks was decided in 1973 and Lovasco was decided in 1977.
140. See cases cited supra note 137.
141. Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 147 (Ind. 1996).
142. See Marshall v. State, 832 N.E.2d 615, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
143. 555 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1996). State v. Brown modified the holding in
Trompeter, but it seems to have only done so by imposing what the court called a “more
manageable statement,” one that now looks at whether there is actual prejudice before
determining whether the delay was unreasonable. 656 N.W.2d 355, 363 & n.6 (Iowa 2003).
144. Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d at 470.
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test.145 Lange, however, also stated another proposition that seems to
be at odds with conducting a balancing test. Regarding the actual
prejudice prong, the court in Lange stated that “[t]he actual prejudice
must result from the State’s ‘intentional attempt to gain a tactical
advantage by delaying the initiation of charges.’ ”146 Therefore, Iowa
has been placed in this category.
NEVADA. In Nevada, proving a due process violation based on
pre-accusation delay requires a showing of bad faith. Specifically, a
defendant must demonstrate “(1) that he or she suffered actual, nonspeculative prejudice from the delay; and (2) that the prosecution intentionally delayed bringing the charges in order to gain a tactical
advantage over the [defendant], or that the prosecution delayed in
bad faith.”147 Interestingly, the Nevada Supreme Court cited two cases in support of this strict, two-prong test: Lovasco and DeGeorge.148
Obviously, that is not the clear holding of Lovasco.149 More importantly, however, DeGeorge is a Ninth Circuit case, and like in other Ninth
Circuit cases, the court applied a balancing test rather than adopting
a strict bad-faith requirement.150 Moreover, throughout its discussion,
the Nevada Supreme Court also cited other Ninth Circuit cases to
support its contrary analysis.151
PENNSYLVANIA. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed
pre-accusation delay at length in Commonwealth v. Snyder,152 and
subsequently built upon that discussion in Commonwealth v.
Scher.153 Claims of pre-accusation delay in Pennsylvania are analyzed
in the same manner under the federal and state constitutions.154 The
court in Scher recognized:
[A] two-prong test emerged from Marion and Lovasco to establish
a due process claim for pre-[accusation] delay: (1) the defendant
must show actual prejudice from the delay, and (2) prejudice alone
is not sufficient to show a violation of due process where the delay
was due to the government’s continuing investigation of the crime.155


145. See id.; see also State v. Lange, 531 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1995).
146. Lange, 531 N.W.2d at 111 (quoting State v. Wagner, 410 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1987)).
147. Wyman v. State, 217 P.3d 572, 578 (Nev. 2009) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 784 (1977); United States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2004)).
148. See cases cited supra note 147.
149. See generally Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783.
150. See DeGeorge, 380 F.3d at 1210; see also supra Part III.C.
151. See Wyman, 217 P.3d at 579.
152. 713 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1998).
153. 803 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 2002).
154. See id. at 1215 (“[W]ith respect to claims of violation of due process caused by prearrest delay, ‘our analysis is the same pursuant to both due process clauses.’ ” (quoting
Snyder, 713 A.2d at 602)).
155. Id. at 1217.
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As the court proceeded, it further clarified that negligence alone will
not violate due process and instead required the defendant to show
intentional conduct, bad faith, or recklessness by the government.156
B. States that Reject the Strict Two-Prong Test
States that reject the strict two-prong test include: Alaska,157 California,158 Florida,159 Hawaii,160 Illinois,161 Louisiana,162 Maine,163 Montana,164 New Hampshire,165 North Dakota,166 Ohio,167 Oregon,168 South


156. See id. at 1221-22 (“We agree with this rationale that negligence or due diligence
in the conduct of a criminal investigation is not the appropriate standard for deciding
whether delay in indictment deprives a defendant of due process. As a result, the test that
we believe is the correct one must take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case, including: the deference that courts must afford to the prosecutor’s
conclusions that a case is not ripe for prosecution; the limited resources available to law
enforcement agencies when conducting a criminal investigation; the prosecutor’s motives in
delaying indictment, and; the degree to which the defendant’s own actions contributed to
the delay. Therefore, to clarify the standard established in Snyder, we hold . . . the
defendant must first show that the delay caused him actual prejudice, that is, substantially
impaired his or her ability to defend against the charges. The court must then examine all
of the circumstances to determine the validity of the Commonwealth’s reasons for the
delay. Only in situations where the evidence shows that the delay was the product of
intentional, bad faith, or reckless conduct by the prosecution, however, will we find a
violation of due process. Negligence in the conduct of a criminal investigation, without
more, will not be sufficient to prevail on a due process claim based on pre-arrest delay.”
(footnote omitted)).
157. See infra p. 677.
158. See infra pp. 677-78.
159. See infra pp. 678-79.
160. See, e.g., State v. Higa, 74 P.3d 6, 10 (Haw. 2003).
161. See People v. Lawson, 367 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Ill. 1977) (“[T]he defendant must
come forward with a clear showing of actual and substantial prejudice. . . . If the
[defendant] satisfies the trial court that he or she has been substantially prejudiced by the
delay, then the burden shifts to the State to show the reasonableness, if not the necessity,
of the delay.”). In Lawson, the court denied the State’s petition for rehearing, but in doing
so, it issued a supplemental opinion to address Lovasco, which was released shortly after
the initial Lawson opinion. The court’s position remained the same. See id. at 1249 (“The
court’s conduct of the inquiry requires the defendant to come forward with a clear
demonstration of actual and substantial prejudice before the State presents a showing of
reasonableness. The court then balances the competing interests. This is consistent with
the Lovasco requirement of a demonstration of prejudice to the defendant and an inquiry into
the reasonableness of the delay.”). Even though the Illinois Supreme Court clearly announced
its position in Lawson, at least one intermediate appellate court in Illinois has failed to
follow the supreme court. See People v. Totzke, 974 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
162. See, e.g., State v. Schrader, 518 So. 2d 1024, 1028 (La. 1988).
163. See, e.g., State v. Rippy, 626 A.2d 334, 338 (Me. 1993) (“[T]he defendant must first
demonstrate ‘actual and unjustifiable prejudice’ resulting from the delay. Only then do we
inquire as to the reasons for the delay offered by the State and determine, whether, on
balance, the delay remains unjustified.” (citations omitted)).
164. See, e.g., State v. Passmore, 2010 MT 34, ¶ 29, 355 Mont. 187, 225 P.3d 1229. In
Montana, negligence can be considered, but when courts conduct the balancing test,
negligence is not weighed as heavily as deliberate government action. Id.
165. See, e.g., State v. Knickerbocker, 880 A.2d 419, 423 (N.H. 2005).
166. See, e.g., State v. Denny, 351 N.W.2d 102, 104 (N.D. 1984). Significantly though,
while the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the requirement of actual prejudice in
Denny, it did not find actual prejudice, but proceeded to “balance[] the reasonableness of
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Carolina,169 Washington,170 and West Virginia.171 Most of these states
use a balancing test after finding actual prejudice.
ALASKA. Alaska has not explicitly adopted a balancing test, but
it has rejected the strict approach used by the majority of federal and
state courts. Under state law in Alaska, a successful claim requires
proving unreasonable delay and actual prejudice.172 The state must
provide reasons for the delay, but the defendant has the burden of
establishing prejudice and that the state’s justifications were unreasonable.173 In a previous case, Alaska notably considered this test to
be the proper analysis under the United States Constitution as
well.174 While Alaska did not explicitly adopt a balancing test in Gonzales,175 it did expressly reject the strict bad-faith approach.176 However, Alaska’s inquiry looks into the reasonableness of the delay before considering actual prejudice; this seems to indicate that if anything is to be balanced, it is only whether the government’s reason(s)
fall on the side of reasonable or unreasonable rather than how they
balance against the actual prejudice where prejudice is found.
CALIFORNIA. Similar to the Nevada Supreme Court, albeit with
a different result, the California Supreme Court has, to a certain degree, deviated from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the law governing pre-accusation delay. Pursuant to the California Constitution,
California courts first require actual prejudice.177 Upon a finding of
actual prejudice, the prosecution is asked to provide reasons to justify


the delay against the alleged prejudice” anyway. Id. at 105. Even if it did so mistakenly, it
seems pretty clear that North Dakota’s intent is to follow the same approach as the other
balancing states. See id.; see also State v. Weisz, 356 N.W.2d 462, 464 (N.D. 1984) (“The
reasonableness of the delay must be balanced against the prejudice to the accused.”).
167. See infra p. 679.
168. See State v. Stokes, 248 P.3d 953, 960-64 (Or. 2011).
169. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 653 S.E.2d 259, 260 (S.C. 2007). Like Wyoming, South
Carolina has no statutes of limitation for criminal offenses. See Powell, supra note 132,
at 147.
170. See infra pp. 679-81.
171. See, e.g., State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire, 678 S.E.2d 847, 856 (W. Va. 2009).
172. State v. Gonzales, 156 P.3d 407, 411 (Alaska 2007).
173. Id. at 412.
174. See Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Alaska 1980) (“Two factors are to be
considered under both federal and state law: (1) the reasonableness of the delay and (2) the
resulting harm to the accused.” (quoting Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514, 519 (Alaska 1978))).
Unlike Burke, Gonzales only mentions “[s]tate due process challenges” when it introduces
the same two-part test used in Burke. See Gonzales, 156 P.3d at 411.
175. See generally Gonzales, 156 P.3d 407.
176. See id. at 411 n.23 (“The state argues that we should explicitly adopt the
prevailing standard in most federal jurisdictions: a presumption that the state is acting
reasonably in cases of delay unless the defendant can show that the state is acting in bad
faith. We decline to adopt that approach at this time.”).
177. See, e.g., People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1101 (Cal. 2010); People v. Nelson, 185
P.3d 49, 54 (Cal. 2008).
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the delay.178 Finally, California courts balance the prejudice to the
defendant and the prosecution’s justifications.179 Moreover,
[u]nder the California standard, “negligent, as well as purposeful,
delay in bringing charges may, when accompanied by a showing of
prejudice, violate due process. This does not mean, however, that
whether the delay was purposeful or negligent is irrelevant.” Rather, “whether the delay was purposeful or negligent is relevant to
the balancing process. Purposeful delay to gain advantage is totally unjustified, and a relatively weak showing of prejudice would
suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due process violation. If
the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice
would be required to establish a due process violation.” The justification for the delay is strong when there is “investigative delay,
nothing else.”180

The California Supreme Court’s handling of these cases is significant
because, despite acknowledging federal law on the topic “is not entirely settled,”181 the court appears to be under the impression that
the United States Constitution requires a showing of intentional, tactical delay or bad faith.182 Thus, it seems to follow the same approach
as the Ninth Circuit on state law grounds; ironically, however, the California Supreme Court appears to disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of federal law.
FLORIDA. In Rogers v. State, the Florida Supreme Court
approved use of the Townley test in pre-accusation delay cases, a
test Florida’s First District Court of Appeal previously adopted in
Howell v. State.183 Specifically,
[w]hen a defendant asserts a due process violation based on pre[accusation] delay, he bears the initial burden of showing actual
prejudice. . . . If the defendant meets this initial burden, the court
then must balance the demonstrable reasons for delay against the
gravity of the particular prejudice on a case-by-case basis. The outcome turns on whether the delay violates the fundamental conception of justice, decency and fair play embodied in the Bill of Rights
and fourteenth amendment.184


178. See cases cited supra note 177.
179. See cases cited supra note 177.
180. Cowan, 236 P.3d at 1101 (citations omitted).
181. Nelson, 185 P.3d at 55.
182. See id. (“Regarding the federal constitutional standard, we have stated that ‘[a]
claim based upon the federal Constitution also requires a showing that the delay was
undertaken to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant.’ ” (quoting People v. Catlin, 26
P.3d 357, 373 (Cal. 2001))).
183. See Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla. 1987); Howell v. State, 418 So. 2d
1164, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
184. Rogers, 511 So. 2d at 531; see also United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 581-82
(5th Cir. 1982); Howell, 418 So. 2d at 1170.
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Even though Townley is no longer good law in the Fifth Circuit,185
the Townley test remains the correct test in Florida.186 The First
District Court of Appeal recently noted in Hope that Overton and
Rivera—decided eleven years and two years, respectively, after
Crouch—continued to apply the Townley test that was adopted in
Howell and Rogers.187 Significantly, neither Overton nor Rivera noted
that the Townley test was subsequently rejected by the en banc Fifth
Circuit in Crouch.188
OHIO. Ohio’s approach resembles the general balancing approach.
State v. Luck is a leading Ohio case on pre-accusation delay.189 In
Luck, the court recognized that actual prejudice is a prerequisite if
one is to succeed with a claim of pre-accusation delay.190 However, it
held that determining at trial whether a defendant was actually
prejudiced by the delay requires balancing the asserted prejudice
against other admissible evidence.191 If actual prejudice is found, the
second part of the test from Lovasco then requires finding no justifiable reasons for the delay.192 Of course, deliberate delay is an unjustifiable reason.193 In Ohio, however, negligence and error in judgment
by the state are also unjustifiable if the state stops investigating and
subsequently chooses to prosecute without obtaining additional evidence.194 When negligence or error in judgment constitutes the reason
for the delay, “[t]he length of delay will normally be the key factor in
determining whether” it was justifiable.195 At least one appellate case
in Ohio has interpreted Luck to mean “court[s] must balance the prejudice suffered by the accused with the state’s reason for the delay.”196
WASHINGTON. State v. Calderon197 marked the first time the
Washington Supreme Court reviewed pre-accusation delay following
Lovasco.198 In Calderon, the court reiterated that demonstrating
prejudice is required to prove the delay violated a defendant’s due

185. See supra Part III.A.
186. See State v. Hope, 89 So. 3d 1132, 1136-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); see also Overton v.
State, 976 So. 2d 536, 560 (Fla. 2007); Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477, 483 (Fla. 1998).
187. Hope, 89 So. 3d at 1136-37.
188. See generally Overton, 976 So. 2d 536; Rivera, 717 So. 2d 477.
189. See 472 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio 1984).
190. See id. at 1102.
191. Id. at 1102, 1104. Specifically, in Luck, the court stated that “[t]he prejudicial
factors enumerated by defense counsel (the deaths of witnesses, the fading of memories,
and the loss of evidence), when balanced against the other admissible evidence in this case,
show that the defendant has suffered actual prejudice by the fifteen-year delay in
prosecution.” Id. at 1104.
192. Id. at 1105.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. State v. Glazer, 677 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
197. 684 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1984), modified by State v. Oppelt, 257 P.3d 653 (Wash. 2011).
198. See Oppelt, 257 P.3d at 656.
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process rights and that the inquiry requires consideration of the
prejudice and the reasons for the delay.199 According to the court, “[i]f
the [government] is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake
a further balancing of the [government]’s interest and the prejudice to
the [defendant].”200
In Oppelt, the court upheld the general approach it applied in
Calderon and agreed that a balancing test should be used as the final
step.201 The court, however, slightly modified its Calderon holding; it
clarified that the due process test requires balancing, irrespective of
whether the government’s reasons for the delay are justified.202 Thus,
[t]he test, simply stated, is that (1) the defendant must show actual prejudice from the delay; (2) if the defendant shows prejudice,
the court must determine the [government’s] reasons for the delay;
(3) the court must then weigh the reasons and the prejudice to determine whether fundamental conceptions of justice would be violated by allowing prosecution.203

The court recognized that Washington courts have advanced conflicting interpretations of what must be balanced.204 As a result, it clarified
that the reasons for the delay and the resulting prejudice must be balanced against each other.205 On the other hand, the delay itself and
the government’s interest are not balanced against the prejudice.206
The Oppelt court also discussed its rationale for proceeding with
its three-part test, which concluded with the balancing prong.207 It
stated that the distinct, bright-line approaches urged by the parties
confused the proper analytical framework to apply “in answering the
core question of whether the government action violates fundamental
conceptions of justice.”208 According to the court, mere negligence
could result in a due process violation, but to survive the balancing
test, the prejudice would have to be greater than that required in a
case involving deliberate delay or bad faith.209 The court voiced its
agreement with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, which have also stated that “negligent delay can violate due process.”210 Moreover, it stated
that answering whether government behavior “violates fundamental


199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Calderon, 684 P.2d at 1296.
Id. (citing United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980)).
See Oppelt, 257 P.3d at 656-60.
See id.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 657-59.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 658, 660.
Id. at 658.
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conceptions of justice . . . does not necessarily turn on the intent of
the government actors.”211
C. States Without a Clear Position
The States discussed in this section cannot be appropriately placed
into either of the two main categories, as their positions are unclear.
COLORADO. Colorado’s approach is unclear due to the inconsistencies in its case law on pre-accusation delay. In People v. Small, the
court asserted that a successful claim requires proving actual prejudice and “[i]ntentional or negligent misconduct” by the government.212
The Small court did not mention balancing in its due process analysis, however;213 it only did so in its discussion of speedy trial.214 Still,
despite the court’s willingness to consider negligent misconduct in
Small, the Colorado Supreme Court had previously stated in People
v. Hutchinson that “mere displeasure . . . with a delay in the district
attorney’s issuance of the arrest warrant does not justify the dismissal of charges against the defendant, at least in the absence of a
showing that the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical
advantage.”215 Furthermore, in discussing a similar issue in People v.
McClure, the Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis muddied the waters
with respect to what it considers to be the proper test by making intentional, tactical delay a mere factor—as opposed to a requirement.216
DELAWARE. In Preston v. State, a pre-Lovasco case, the Delaware
Supreme Court interpreted Marion to require actual and substantial


211. Id.
212. 631 P.2d 148, 157 (Colo. 1981).
213. See generally id.
214. See id. at 154-56.
215. 557 P.2d 376, 377 (Colo. 1976). Unlike Small, Hutchinson was decided before
Lovasco, but both cases appear to be good law.
216. See generally 756 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1988). In McClure, the Colorado Supreme Court
used an approach similar to the one it used in People v. Hall, 729 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1986).
The court stated the following in Hall:
Unlike the right to a speedy trial, there is no constitutional right to a speedy
arrest. However, a point can be reached where the delay is so great that the
prejudice to the defendant caused by it—due to faded memories of parties
and witnesses, loss of contact with witnesses, and loss of documents—becomes
so great that due process and fundamental fairness require that the charges
be dismissed.
This court has recognized “certain key factors” to be examined in this
inquiry, which include: (1) loss of defense witnesses; (2) whether the delay was
purposeful and intended to prejudice the defendant; (3) the kind and quantum
of evidence available to the prosecution; and (4) general considerations of
justice and fair play. This list is not exhaustive.
Id. at 375 (citations omitted). Both McClure and Hall followed the court’s approach in People
ex rel. Coca v. District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 530 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1975).
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prejudice or intentional, tactical delay.217 In a 1990 case, the court
issued an order that cited Preston in stating that same disjunctive
proposition.218 A few months later, the court issued another order
that also cited Preston; this time, however, the court only stated that
“[t]o prevail on the issue of pre-[accusation] delay, a defendant must
show that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the delay.”219 Where Delaware stands today is unclear, but as discussed
above, actual prejudice is necessary—but not sufficient—to bring a
successful claim of pre-accusation delay, at least under federal law.220
MICHIGAN. The path followed in Michigan is unclear, as the
Michigan Supreme Court has not yet adjudicated a claim of preaccusation delay on the merits. It had the opportunity to do so in
People v. Mercer but chose not to.221 Instead, it remanded the case on
other grounds.222 The dissent vehemently objected to the majority’s
decision to avoid the issue.223 As the dissent stated,
I would address [this] jurisprudentially significant issue . . . . By
failing to resolve this issue, this Court will potentially subject defendant to an unfair trial. . . . Further, by evading the opportunity to
resolve the proper standard applicable to similar pre[-accusation]
delay cases, this Court potentially subjects many more defendants
in this state to stale, unfair prosecutions.224

The dissent also noted the split among federal and state courts and that
panels on the Michigan Court of Appeals have applied different tests.225
NEW YORK. New York initially appeared to reject the strict twoprong test, but developments in New York case law are unclear with
regard to whether that is still true today. Nevertheless, the majority
and dissenting opinions in People v. Vernace are instructive on New
York’s treatment of pre-accusation delay claims under state law. At
first glance, New York seemingly analyzes these claims in a markedly similar manner to speedy trial claims.226 Specifically, New York


217. 338 A.2d 562, 567 (Del. 1975).
218. See Watts v. State, No. 183,1989, 1990 WL 38279, at *2 (Del. 1990). According to
the 1984 commentary to Rule 17 of the Delaware Supreme Court rules, orders of the
Delaware Supreme Court can be cited as precedent in Delaware courts.
219. Ellington v. State, No. 369,1989, 1990 WL 84694, at *1 (Del. 1990).
220. See supra text accompanying note 28.
221. See 752 N.W.2d 470, 470 (Mich. 2008).
222. See id.
223. See id. at 471-74 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 473. A law review article has discussed pre-accusation delay and how it is
examined by Michigan courts, see Thomas E. Brennan, Jr., Dismissal and Prearraignment
Delay: Time Is of the Essence, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 493, 500-02 (1987), but much time has
passed since the publication of that article.
226. See People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001) (“In this State, ‘we have
never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when
dealing with delays in prosecution. Indeed, the factors utilized to determine if a defendant’s
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“[c]ourts must engage in a sensitive weighing process of [five] diversified factors.”227 Those factors are: “ ‘(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the
reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge;
(4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the
defense has been impaired by reason of the delay.’ ”228 However, despite using this test—one with factors instead of requirements—the
court in Vernace echoed the sentiment that “a determination made in
good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive
[a] defendant of due process even though there may be some prejudice to [the] defendant.”229 The dissent, however, opined:
Our case law is well-settled with respect to the effect of such inordinate pre-accusatory prosecutorial delay. In contrast to the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, we view an unjustified, protracted pre-indictment delay in prosecution . . . as a deprivation of
a defendant’s State constitutional right to due process, without requiring a showing of actual prejudice.
Our settled case law also holds that “[w]here there has been a
prolonged delay, we impose a burden on the prosecution to establish good cause.”230

Still, in light of the majority opinion, New York’s case law does not
appear to be entirely settled.
SOUTH DAKOTA. South Dakota’s approach cannot be definitively
categorized. In State v. Stock, which appears to offer a better discussion of pre-accusation delay than any other South Dakota Supreme
Court case, the court did not mention anything about balancing.231 It
also seemed to stray away from the approach of the states that require deliberate or reckless action, but it did not do so in a manner
that is strong enough to suggest it rejects the strict two-prong test.232


rights have been abridged are the same whether the right asserted is a speedy trial right or
the due process right to prompt prosecution.” (citations omitted)); see also Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972) (discussing the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment).
227. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67.
228. People v. Decker, 912 N.E.2d 1041, 1042-43 (N.Y. 2009) (quoting People v.
Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. 1975)); see also Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67.
229. 756 N.E.2d at 68 (citing People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1978)).
230. Id. at 68-69 (Levine, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
231. See generally 361 N.W.2d 280 (S.D. 1985).
232. See id. at 284 (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that preaccusatorial delay by the
state will routinely be held not to result in due process violations. We agree with the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that ‘[e]ven the legitimate excuse of a continuing undercover
investigation may be stretched to the breaking point; at some point, the accused’s right to
due process of law must prevail.’ Moreover, we hold that the burden of establishing
justification for preaccusatorial delay rests squarely upon the state.” (citations omitted)).
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TENNESSEE. Tennessee’s overall position is unclear, as it seems
to alter its test for pre-accusation delay cases depending on certain
circumstances. In State v. Dykes, the court of criminal appeals said
obtaining relief requires “prov[ing] that (a) there was a delay, (b) the
accused sustained actual prejudice as a direct and proximate result of
the delay, and (c) the State caused the delay in order to gain tactical
advantage over or to harass the accused.”233 Almost six years later, in
State v. Gray, the Tennessee Supreme Court found Dykes “to be inapposite” under Gray’s facts.234 The court found Gray to be different
because it involved a delay of forty-two years, rather than only one
year like in Dykes.235 In addition, the court reasoned Dykes was distinguishable because, in that case, “the State had knowledge of the
offense from the time of commission. In the instant case there was no
such knowledge.”236 The court further stated:
[T]he Marion-Dykes approach . . . places a daunting, almost insurmountable, burden on the accused by requiring a demonstration not only that the delay has caused prejudice but also that the
State orchestrated the delay in order to obtain a tactical advantage. Thus, under the facts before us, application of so stringent a standard would force a result we would consider unconstitutional, unwarranted, and unfair. To accomplish justice while preserving Gray’s right to a fair trial requires, in our view, a less
stringent standard.
Today we articulate a standard by which to evaluate preaccusatorial delay and hold that an untimely prosecution may be
subject to dismissal upon Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due
process grounds and under Article I, §§ 8 and 9, of the Tennessee
Constitution even though in the interim the defendant was neither
formally accused, restrained, nor incarcerated for the offense. In
determining whether pre-accusatorial delay violates due process,
the trial court must consider the length of the delay, the reason for
the delay, and the degree of prejudice, if any, to the accused.237

About a year and a half later, the court further expounded upon
its standard in State v. Utley.238 Lingering questions, however, led the
court to return to the topic in State v. Carico shortly thereafter to
clarify where it stood in light of Dykes, Gray, and Utley.239 It noted that
“Utley . . . limited the test adopted in Gray to cases in which the State
had no knowledge that a criminal offense had been committed.”240


233. 803 S.W.2d 250, 256 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000).
234. 917 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tenn. 1996).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 673.
238. See 956 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tenn. 1997).
239. See generally State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. 1998).
240. Id. at 284-85.
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Furthermore, “[a]s recognized in Utley, a showing that ‘the delay was
an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over the [defendant]’ is a significant factor in determining if the defendant’s due process rights have been violated.”241 Thus, where Tennessee stands, in a
sense, varies case by case.
V. A FURTHER ANALYSIS OF PRE-ACCUSATION DELAY AND A CALL FOR
SUPREME COURT ACTION
As it currently stands, successfully proving that pre-accusation
delay caused a violation of a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause is difficult in both federal and state courts.242 It is hard to
imagine that the Supreme Court envisioned it being so difficult when
the Court established the protection. Although proving this constitutional violation is not easy, a test that does not require intentional,
tactical delay or bad faith still likely results in the extra occasional
dismissal for defendants who were greatly prejudiced by the delay—
quite possibly innocent defendants. With actual prejudice being a
prerequisite to that dismissal under nearly any test, the defendant is
already faced with a heavy burden.243 Perhaps that burden of proving
actual prejudice is not nearly enough though, and the conduct of government actors (i.e., the police and/or the prosecution) matters. As
discussed in this Note, every federal circuit and almost every state
has spoken on this issue,244 but the Supreme Court has not addressed
it since 1977.245 The time has come. This Part will further explore
pre-accusation delay and advocate that the Supreme Court reconsider the issue, and ultimately decide what it holds to be the proper test
for adjudicating these claims.
Existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue has unequivocally stated that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause has
distinct purposes from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and is thus inapplicable in the pre-accusation delay context.246 State
courts in New York have nevertheless chosen to apply the speedy tri-


241. Id. at 285 n.4 (quoting Utley, 956 S.W.2d at 495).
242. In 1990, one law review article said that only a few cases “have found preaccusation delay to transgress due process strictures.” See Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 628
n.105. Over twenty years have passed since that article was written, however, and many
more cases have been decided in that time. While proving a due process violation based on
pre-accusation delay remains difficult, additional cases have nonetheless found a violation
to exist. See, e.g., State v. Hope, 89 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
243. This heavy burden of demonstrating actual prejudice has led to an extremely low
number of appellate courts upholding these claims. See Michael J. Cleary, Pre-Indictment
Delay: Establishing a Fairer Approach Based on United States v. Marion and United
States v. Lovasco, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1049, 1070 n.209 (2005) (citing United States v.
Huntley, 976 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992)).
244. See supra Parts III-IV.
245. See supra Part II.
246. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text; infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
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al test to these due process claims.247 In addition, courts in other
states have drawn parallels between the two constitutional protections, and at least one law review article has done the same.248 This is
in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has expressly stated that
a defendant’s rights with regard to pre-accusation delay under the
Due Process Clause are different from her Sixth Amendment speedy
trial rights in multiple ways:
In our view, however, the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision
has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an “accused” . . . .
. . . On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only
when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those
persons who have been “accused” in the course of that prosecution.
These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not
yet accused . . . .249
. . . The framers could hardly have selected less appropriate language if they had intended the speedy trial provision to protect
against pre-accusation delay. . . .250
....
It is apparent also that very little support for appellees’ position emerges from a consideration of the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment’s speedy trial provision . . . .251
. . . [Therefore, the] possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper context.252

The Supreme Court’s pronouncements currently make drawing
parallels between the two provisions inappropriate, at least under
federal law. The above language from Marion demonstrates that the
Supreme Court was unwavering in stating that the analysis under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should remain separated from one
another in this context. Additionally, while not restating the exact
same language verbatim in United States v. Lovasco, the Supreme
Court still strongly reiterated the difference between the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights at play.253 Whether examining the two con-


247. See supra pp. 682-83.
248. See Cleary, supra note 243 at 1066-68, 1074-76.
249. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).
250. Id. at 314-15.
251. Id. at 320.
252. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
253. See 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977) (“We held that as far as the Speedy Trial Clause
of the Sixth Amendment is concerned, [pre-accusation] delay is wholly irrelevant, since our
analysis of the language, history, and purposes of the Clause persuaded us that only ‘a
formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and
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stitutional protections side-by-side should be appropriate is another
matter. Only if the Supreme Court chose to retreat from its earlier,
robust differentiation of the two rights would it be proper for courts
to compare them in choosing which test to implement. This does not
mean a balancing test is inappropriate to use in analyzing these due
process claims; it only means that speedy trial jurisprudence is an
inappropriate area of law from which to adopt such a balancing test.
Aside from policy considerations,254 one of the primary distinctions
between pre-accusation delay claims and speedy trial claims is that
the former, unlike the latter, has “other mechanisms [e.g., statutes of
limitation] to guard against possible as distinguished from actual
prejudice.”255 While generally true, this is not always the case. For
example, no statutes of limitation exist for any criminal offenses
committed in Wyoming and South Carolina.256 Similarly, Kentucky,257
North Carolina,258 and West Virginia259 do not have statutes of limitation in place for any felonies. In addition, prosecutions of certain offenses, including capital offenses, are not affected by statutes of limitation.260 Perhaps the speedy trial balancing test elicited in Barker v.
Wingo261 should apply to claims of pre-accusation delay when criminal offenses do not have any applicable statute of limitations. Per
holding to answer a criminal charge engage the particular protections’ of that provision.”
(quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 320)).
254. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (“The Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial is thus not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused
by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by
statutes of limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility
of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial,
impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the
disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.”).
255. Marion, 404 U.S. at 322.
256. See supra notes 132, 169.
257. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050(1) (West 2012).
258. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 713 S.E.2d 82, 90 (N.C. 2011) (quoting State v. Johnson,
167 S.E.2d 274, 279 (N.C. 1969)). It is noteworthy that in State v. Swann, 370 S.E.2d 533
(N.C. 1988), the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that “[w]e do not believe the Court’s
holding in Marion was based on the fact that there was a statute of limitations.
Nevertheless in U.S. v. MacDonald, there was no statute of limitations and the Court held
the speedy trial clause does not apply to the pre-accusatory period.” Id. at 536 (citation
omitted). While the North Carolina Supreme Court is correct that the Speedy Trial Clause
did not apply to the pre-accusation delay claim in MacDonald, the facts of MacDonald
(which involved murder charges) still depict a situation very different from that of Marion
and Lovasco. Moreover, the Supreme Court majority in MacDonald did not discuss, let
alone even mention, that the lack of an applicable statute of limitations in the case did or
did not have any effect on the due process analysis. In fact, the Court even stated that the
“interest” of “prevent[ing] prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time . . . is
protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations.” MacDonald,
456 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). Only the dissent mentioned the fact that there was no
applicable statute of limitations in MacDonald. See id. at 17 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
259. See, e.g., State ex rel. State v. Hill, 491 S.E.2d 765, 770 (W. Va. 1997) (citing
State v. Carrico, 427 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1993)).
260. See supra text accompanying note 19.
261. See supra note 2.
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haps another test that presumes prejudice after a certain period of
time should be adopted under those circumstances. Whatever the answer is, it is one that must come from the Supreme Court.
In Marion and Lovasco, the Court addressed pre-accusation delay
claims where applicable statutes of limitation also existed. Marion
involved charges of fraudulent business practices,262 and the indictment in that case was brought prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations.263 Lovasco involved charges of possession of stolen firearms and dealing in firearms without a license.264 The delay in filing
the indictment was approximately a year and a half,265 meaning it
was filed before the five-year statute of limitations expired.266 Thus,
at the very least, the Supreme Court should once again take up this
issue of pre-accusation delay to address what should happen when the
due process claim is asserted in conjunction with a case lacking an applicable statute of limitations. As one law review article stressed,
without applicable statutes of limitation, “the Due Process Clause becomes the sole means of shielding an accused from prejudicial delay.”267
Determining which test is more appropriate for analyzing preaccusation delay claims under the Due Process Clause and which test
better flows from the language in Marion and Lovasco is not an easy
task. Clearly it has confused many courts, which have adopted interpretations all over the map.268 Starting with the prejudice prong, it is
well-established that, at least under federal law, actual prejudice is
required. This is another way in which one’s due process rights against
pre-accusation delay are manifestly different from one’s speedy trial
rights. In the former, actual prejudice is necessary but not sufficient.269 In the latter, prejudice is neither necessary nor sufficient.270
With pre-accusation delay, some courts require “actual, substantial prejudice,” while other courts merely require “actual prejudice”;
but through and through, the applications of both sets of courts seem
to be markedly similar with respect to the prejudice prong. They all
require prejudice that is clear-cut and non-speculative—essentially
prejudice on steroids. Having the Supreme Court clarify some details
surrounding prejudice in relation to pre-accusation delay would certainly provide some much needed guidance to lower courts. After all,
approximately thirty-five years have passed since Lovasco. And while


262. See 404 U.S. 307, 308-09 (1971).
263. Id. at 324.
264. 431 U.S. 783, 784 (1977).
265. Id.
266. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970) (providing for a five-year statute of limitations for
non-capital offenses).
267. Daraie, supra note 132, at 189.
268. See supra Parts III-IV.
269. See supra Part II.
270. See supra note 2.
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the Supreme Court could not concretely state what constituted prejudice then, because only five or six years had passed since Marion,271
it could likely do so now due to the much larger period of time that
has passed and the thousands of additional cases on pre-accusation
delay that have emerged from lower courts in that period.
Where the gap really comes into play with regard to courts’ interpretations of Marion and Lovasco, though, is how those courts examine the government’s reasons for the delay,272 typically under prong
two of the due process test for pre-accusation delay.273 As discussed
above, after finding actual prejudice, “consider[ing] the reasons for
the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused” is also necessary.274
In addition, for a due process violation to occur, the delay must “violate[] those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base
of our civil and political institutions,’ and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ”275 No party would dispute that
an intentional, tactical delay satisfies prong two, something the government even conceded in Marion.276 As a result, it is puzzling why
some courts do not recognize that recklessness should also satisfy
prong two. After all, in Lovasco, the government renewed its concession from Marion and made the additional concession that “[a] due
process violation might also be made out upon a showing of prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to
the prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk
that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense.”277
It should not matter that the Supreme Court recognized the government’s new concession regarding recklessness by footnote.
While recklessness should surely be recognized as an improper
reason, the more problematic question is whether negligence should
also be deemed improper and whether prong two should entail a bal-


271. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796-97 (1977) (“In Marion we conceded
that we could not determine in the abstract the circumstances in which pre[-]accusation
delay would require dismissing prosecutions. More than five years later, that statement
remains true. Indeed, in the intervening years so few defendants have established that
they were prejudiced by delay that neither this Court nor any lower court has had a
sustained opportunity to consider the constitutional significance of various reasons for
delay.” (citation omitted)).
272. Indeed, even the en banc Fifth Circuit in United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497
(5th Cir. 1996), which was steadfast in the position it adopted, acknowledged “that neither
Marion nor Lovasco is crystal clear on this issue, and each opinion contains some language
that can give comfort to either view.” Id. at 1510.
273. The reasons for the delay typically constitute prong two, but not always. Some
courts that require bad faith or intentional, tactical delay may choose to examine that
prong first, probably because it may be easier to dispose of the case on that ground, rather
than having to pursue an analysis of prejudice.
274. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; see also supra text accompanying note 29.
275. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; see also supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
276. See 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
277. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 n.17.
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ancing test over the stricter approach. Negligence is without a doubt
unlike legitimate investigative delay. Moreover, a balancing test that
recognizes negligence as improper is certainly the fairer approach for
defendants raising these due process claims.278 In addition, courts
that employ these balancing tests, which take negligence into account, have asserted that negligence is assigned less weight than bad
faith or recklessness,279 which should at least put advocates of the
stricter bad-faith approach somewhat at ease. Nevertheless, only the
Supreme Court can properly inform us whether a balancing test is
the most appropriate approach and whether it is in line with Marion
and Lovasco.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Due Process Clause issue of pre-accusation delay is ripe for
Supreme Court review. Marion and Lovasco, the leading cases in this
area of law, were both decided in the 1970s. Since that time, the Supreme Court has not decided any cases dealing with the identical
pre-accusation delay issue. On the other hand, every U.S. Court of
Appeals and courts of almost every state have weighed in since then.
This Note not only updates the positions of the federal circuits, but it
also provides the first fifty-state survey on this “jurisprudentially
significant issue.”280 As many of the federal and state cases cited in
this Note demonstrate, courts often become easily confused over the
relevant due process analysis. Also, unlike in 1977, enough cases
have now been decided by lower courts to allow the Supreme Court to
comfortably review the issue in greater depth. As a result, the Court
should now have what it needs to further, and more concretely, expand on its analysis from Lovasco.281


278. See Cleary, supra note 243, at 1073-74.
279. See, e.g., supra pp. 677-78 (California), 679-81 (Washington).
280. See supra text accompanying note 224.
281. As an aside, although this Note does not discuss the issue of what standard of
review courts should apply, that is another related issue the Supreme Court could weigh in
on, or at least a topic that could be written about in the future. A very deferential standard
of review can certainly be quite influential upon an appellate court in its review of preaccusation delay. See, for example, State v. Hope, 89 So. 3d 1132, 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012),
where the appellate court seemingly awarded great deference to the trial court’s decision to
dismiss the defendant’s case based on pre-accusation delay.

